

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT**

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE SIXTY-NINTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 14 August 1962, at 10 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. M. TARABANOV

(Bulgaria)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. J.A. de ARAUJO CASTRO
Mr. RODRIGUES RIBAS
Mr. de ALENCAR ARARIPE
Mr. JANOS LENGYEL

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV
Mr. N. MINTCHEV
Mr. G. GUELEV
Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV

Burma:

Mr. J. BARRINGTON
U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
Mr. J.E.G. HARDY
Mr. J.F.M. BELL
Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. J. HAJEK
Mr. M. ZEMLA
Mr. J. RIHA

Ethiopia:

ATO HADDIS ALAMAYEHU
ATO M. HAMID
ATO GETACHEW KEBRETH

India:

Mr. A.S. LALL
Mr. A.S. NEHTA
Mr. K.K. RAO
Mr. G.D. COMMAR

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. A. CAGIATI
Mr. C. COSTA-REGHINI
Mr. LUCIOLI OTTIERI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO
Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG
Miss E. AGUIRRE
Mr. D. GONZALES GOMEZ

Nigeria:

Mr. M.T. MBU
Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. LACHS
Mr. S. ROGULSKI
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI
Mr. W. WIECZOREK

Romania:

Mr. H. FLORESCU
Mr. E. GLASER
Mr. N. ECOBESCU
Mr. M. PREDESCU

Sweden:

Baron C.H. von PLATEN
Mr. P. KALLIN
Mr. B. FRIEDMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V.V. KUZNETSOV
Mr. V.A. ZORIN
Mr. A.A. ROSCHIN
Mr. P.F. SHAKOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A. FATTAH HASSAN
Mr. M.H. EL-ZAYYAT
Mr. A.E. ABDEL MAGUID
Mr. S. AHMED

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Mr. J.B. GOLBER

Sir MICHAEL WRIGHT

Sir SOLLY ZUCKERMAN

Mr. P. SMITHERS

United States of America:

Mr. A.H. DEAN

Mr. C.C. STELLE

Mr. A.S. FISHER

Mr. D.E. MARK

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. O. LOUTFI

Deputy to the Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Bulgaria) (translation from French): I declare open the sixth-ninth plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Before I read out the list of speakers for today's meeting, permit me as today's Chairman to express on behalf of the whole Committee -- for I take it we are all agreed on this -- our warmest congratulations to our Soviet colleagues and to the Government and people of the Soviet Union for that new and superb achievement of Soviet science, the almost simultaneous launching and the co-operation in space of two space ships, Vostok III and Vostok IV. At the same time I should like to send our congratulations to the two Soviet space-pilots Major Nikolaev and Lieutenant-Colonel Popovich.

This success of Soviet scientists, engineers, technicians and space-pilots promises more and more impressive achievements in the conquest of space. The closest peaceful co-operation between all nations would constantly speed progress in man's noble endeavour to conquer outer space. No one doubts that this co-operation can become complete only in a world from which, by our joint efforts, war has been banished for ever. The task entrusted to us in this Committee is precisely that of bringing such a world into being, a world without armaments or war, a world in which there will be no limit to the scope of human thought and genius.

Before we discuss the question on today's agenda, the cessation of nuclear tests, permit me also to welcome to our Committee Mr. Vasili Vasilievich Kuznetsov, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, as Soviet Union representative in our Committee. Let me also thank Mr. Valerian Aleksandrovich Zorin for his contribution to the work of our Conference and to the progress so far achieved in our important task.

Mr. KUZNETSOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I am grateful to you, Mr. Chairman, for the high appraisal which you have given to the latest achievement of Soviet science in the exploration of space for peaceful purposes. There is no doubt that it is an outstanding contribution which will be to the benefit of the whole of mankind.

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

I should also like to thank you for the kind words which you addressed to me. On my part, I should also like to greet the members of the Committee on Disarmament and to express my readiness to co-operate with them in a fruitful manner. I take this opportunity to emphasize that the Soviet Government is as fully determined as ever to reach a solution of this crucial international problem — the problem of general and complete disarmament. My Government regards it as the most important factor for preserving and strengthening peace. This noble aim will undoubtedly be achieved, if all the members of the Committee make combined efforts to overcome the obstacles which stand in the way of our reaching an agreement. The Soviet delegation considers that its task from now on is to contribute to the achievement of this goal in every possible way.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): Before beginning my prepared statement on the subject of nuclear testing I also should like to welcome our new colleague from the Soviet Union, Mr. Kuznetsov, First Deputy Foreign Minister. He is not new to us; in fact, he attended the Carnegie Institute in the United States. We have worked with him at various times in the past and we are confident that he will continue to keep in being the excellent relationship established between Mr. Zorin and myself. We are grateful to him for the statement which he made to us this morning.

In welcoming Mr. Kuznetsov it is, of course, necessary to say goodbye to Mr. Zorin, with whom I have worked so closely in the past two months in the co-Chairmen's meetings. Mr. Zorin has been an able and a courteous representative of his Government here. We have worked together, as all members of the Committee are aware, finding those areas on which we could agree and narrowing down the areas where we could not agree; at all times our relationship with Mr. Zorin has been most pleasant, cordial and workmanlike and I am sure that our relationship with Mr. Kuznetsov will be the same. We hope that Mr. Zorin is able to take a good vacation before he has to go on to the United Nations General Assembly as head of the Soviet delegation there.

In addition to what the Chairman has said I also should like to congratulate the Soviet Union for its fine scientific and technical achievement in outer space. The Soviet astronauts are to be praised for their courage. I know that I reflect

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the wishes of all the people of the United States when I re-echo President Kennedy's wish that the Soviet astronauts will have a safe return to earth, that this advancement in science will be for the common benefit of all peoples, and that we can soon ensure that all development in outer space is for peaceful and not for military purposes. As we advance man's threshold of knowledge in this scientific field we must also advance our political knowledge and our political aims at the same time, so that we shall not find ourselves engulfed in our own scientific achievements.

Perhaps the Chairman will permit a small note of levity if I call the attention of all representatives to a cartoon in the Daily Express of today's date a copy of which Sir Michael Wright has shown me. The cartoon indicates three small children knocking on the bathroom door and saying to their mother: "The Russians have been round the world twice since Grandma's been in there."

Let me begin my presentation today by re-stating that the goal of the United States is to achieve a workable and effective treaty banning all nuclear weapon tests in all environments for all time. During the past few years the United States has devoted a great deal of effort to dealing with all aspects of the issues which have been the major stumbling blocks in the path of reaching agreement -- the detection, location and identification of underground nuclear tests.

When the eight new members of the Conference, on 16 April 1962, addressed an earnest appeal to the nuclear Powers to reach agreement on a test ban treaty and coupled that appeal to a joint memorandum (ENDC/28), the United States sought to reply by intensifying its evaluation of the status of scientific efforts to establish effective verification of a treaty banning all nuclear weapon tests. That evaluation included also an appraisal of the political and military factors which affect the reaching of agreement. Our evaluation has covered a review of the findings, which have only recently become available, of the United States research programme on detection, identification and location of underground seismic events and an analysis of seismic data produced by the recent United States underground test series.

The review has shown that much of the technical data resulting from the United States programme bears on the efforts of the United States to respond to the eight-nation initiative to achieve a workable comprehensive tests ban treaty in all

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environments. The United States now has qualified scientists and technical experts available here in Geneva to assist in explaining in detail these various developments and their significance to all delegations at this Conference. Indeed, we have had the benefit of discussions with scientists from some of the other Governments represented here at the Conference, for which we are most grateful and which we appreciate deeply. At this time, I should only like to summarize two of the developments which offer real promise.

The first development is a reassessment, on the basis of technical developments and increased experience, of seismic detection capability which indicates a substantially better capability to detect -- that is, to record -- seismic events at long range as compared to short range than had been predicted in the past.

The second development is that the number of earthquakes occurring in certain areas of interest comparable to an underground nuclear test of a given magnitude has been substantially reduced from the previous estimate.

These developments are significant, both as to what they change and as to what they do not change. They are significant in three respects.

First, the increase in the long-range detection capability makes it possible to develop without serious degradation a network of control posts with substantially fewer detection stations in the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States and other countries than the number proposed in the United States-United Kingdom treaty draft of 18 April 1961 (ENDC/9). This increase in long-range detection capability makes it possible to place increased reliance upon stations outside the territory of any party to a treaty for detecting events within that country, using a system of stations which includes posts both within and without the country. Also, this development means that the findings of stations near to a seismic event can now be more easily correlated with data received at greater distances from the event. Thus it is possible to rely on a detection system composed of internationally supervised national stations rather than of internationally operated stations.

Second, the decrease in the number of unidentified events with which a verification system will have to cope makes it possible to decrease the number of on-site inspections required for verification.

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Third, these developments do not provide a definitive way of determining from seismic data in all cases that a particular seismic event was not an underground explosion and, therefore, do not eliminate the certain requirement of effective, reliable and objective on-site inspections as an essential element of any efficient system of international verification.

On the basis of these technical conclusions my Government has presented proposals which involve:

- (1) acceptance of the obligatory nature of on-site inspection;
- (2) a willingness to consider a reduction in the number of on-site inspections;
- (3) a willingness to consider a network of detection stations which would involve a number of stations substantially smaller than the number previously proposed, including a substantially smaller number of stations in the Soviet Union; and would involve nationally manned, internationally supervised stations instead of a network of internationally manned and operated stations.

Those new proposals have been presented in hope that the Soviet Union would make a similar urgent and far-reaching effort to narrow the gap which lies between us. They were presented to the Soviet Union at two informal meetings held on Sunday and Monday a week ago and at a meeting (ENDC/SC.I/PV.23, pp.3 et seq.) of the Sub-Committee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests held only last Thursday. The initial reaction of the Soviet Union has been disappointing so far, to say the least. The representative of the Soviet Union has completely rejected the concept of any obligation on the part of a country to facilitate on-site inspection. He has rejected, as nothing new, the change from internationally manned and operated detection stations to nationally operated and internationally supervised detection stations. In this connexion I refer representatives to page 40 of the verbatim record (ENDC/SC.I/PV.23) of the Sub-Committee meeting in question. Mr. Zorin has dismissed as mere details the possible reduction of the number of detection stations, including those on Soviet soil, and the possible reduction of the number of on-site inspections. He bases his position in large part on the eight-nation memorandum which, he states, only allows inspection by invitation. I have read and studied that memorandum many

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times with the greatest of care. I submit that the representative of the Soviet Union has completely misinterpreted both its spirit and its purpose.

Much has been said here about the eight-nation memorandum and the various types of control systems which might be negotiated on the basis of the principles which the eight-nation memorandum contains. While we have differed about the meaning of some of those principles and how they would be incorporated into a system of effective control, there appears to have developed a consensus that at least the principles of the memorandum are concerned with the three essential elements of verification: first, identification, including on-site inspection; second, detection stations; and, third, an international commission. The international commission, I believe we have all agreed, is to play an important role in seeing that the three major elements of verification -- detection, location and identification -- are carried out properly and promptly.

The proposals my delegation has made are an attempt to work out a verification system which includes all three elements presented in the eight-nation memorandum: in short, an attempt to use the memorandum as a means of bringing agreement nearer. The Soviet Union, however, is attempting to use the memorandum for exactly the opposite purpose -- as a means of blocking agreement. Moreover, in relying on the eight-nation memorandum as providing the basis for his flat rejection of the United States proposals, the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Zorin, has made a unilateral interpretation of that memorandum in a manner clearly not justified by its provisions.

A day after the memorandum was submitted the United States asked the authors a series of questions dealing with the interpretation of their memorandum. The response on behalf of the eight was given by Mr. Sahlou, the representative of Ethiopia, speaking at the twenty-fourth meeting of this Committee. Mr. Sahlou said then:

"It is our conviction that the joint memorandum must in most respects rest on its own merits, so to speak. It is not a blueprint for a treaty. It is rather our considered effort to break the deadlock in the three-Power talks. This implies that vast areas in the picture have to be filled in by

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detailed negotiations on the basis suggested in the joint memorandum. No delegation of the eight, I feel, can really give elaborate explanations which would be a substitute for the work that we believe can be undertaken only by the parties concerned. We are not in a position to offer a synopsis that will spare you the effort of new negotiations, new evaluations, new assessments and new compromises." (ENDC/PV.24, page 5)

It seems to me that that is exactly what the United States has been trying to do with the eight-nation memorandum. We have not treated it as a substitute for the work which we believe has to be undertaken by the parties. We have tried to use the eight-nation memorandum in a most constructive way, to work out agreement. But what of the Soviet Union? The Soviet Union attempts to block those efforts at new negotiations, new evaluations, new assessments and new compromises with its unilateral interpretation of the memorandum. The Soviet Union constantly prevents any effort to try to fill in by negotiation or by work the vast areas of the picture which, Mr. Sahlou pointed out, remain to be completed by the three parties participating in the Sub-Committee on a nuclear test ban.

The representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Zorin, has dismissed the substantial movement of the United States in its attempt to obtain agreement as mere matters of detail. I believe that this calls for an examination of the background of the negotiations against which the United States has been making an evaluation of its position. I should like to discuss that background briefly for two reasons: first, because I want to make clear our view of the negotiations — most particularly what is new in the United States position, and where the Soviet Union has retreated; secondly, because it will help to explain why the United States can only conclude, with the greatest regret, that the Soviet Union does not now want a workable test ban treaty and is doing all it possibly can to prevent one from being concluded by beclouding the real issue.

The background to the negotiations falls into three parts: first, a period of almost three years — July 1958 to March 1961 — of slow but basically fruitful negotiations in which the position of the Soviet Union and that of the United States came closer together; then, second, a period of one year — March 1961 to

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April 1962 -- during which the Soviet Union not only repudiated all the positions it had formerly adopted but also adopted positions which went substantially away from those advanced by the United States and the United Kingdom; and then, third, a period of four months following the time when the eight new member nations offered suggestions to bring the positions of the nuclear Powers together.

In the first period the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States conducted serious and continuous negotiations. A wide measure of agreement was achieved. In the United States it was believed that a successful end to the negotiations for a nuclear test ban treaty was in sight. My Government did its utmost of construe the scientific basis for a test ban control system in such a way as to minimize the amount of verification required. Even when data (GEN/DNT/25) advanced by United States scientists in January 1959 indicated that the detection and identification of seismic events was more difficult, my Government did not abandon the negotiations; we continued to work patiently and constructively for an agreement.

During that period -- the early period -- the Soviet Union appeared to accept many elements of verification which the scientists of our two countries had agreed were necessary. Those elements of verification accepted by the Soviet Union included:

1. fifteen control posts to be placed on Soviet territory;
2. the control posts to be manned and operated by an international team, at least two-thirds of whom would not be Soviet nationals;
3. on-site inspection of unidentified events to be obligatory. At the same time the United States, in move after move, sought to work towards a treaty. It offered to reduce the number of control posts in the Soviet Union; it offered to reduce the number of on-site inspections; the United States and the United Kingdom agreed to allow more Soviet nationals to man posts on Soviet territory.

That was the first period of our negotiations.

In the spring of 1961 the United States again entered into resumed negotiations for a nuclear test ban treaty with several creative and thoughtful additional moves towards reaching agreement on a workable treaty. But the Soviet Union replied by moving backwards; unfortunately it reversed its position and advanced (GEN/DNT/PV.274, p.14) the concept of a three-man self-cancelling directorate to

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administer and operate the control system. Despite the forward-looking and constructive United States proposals, the Soviet Union then refused to negotiate on any other part of a test ban treaty. Still the United States and the United Kingdom did not give up. We made further moves in May, and again in August 1961. Each of those moves was creative and far-reaching. On the very evening on which we had made one of our most constructive proposals -- 30 August 1961 -- the Soviet Union announced that it was going to resume nuclear testing, and on 1 September 1961 the Soviet Union began a large series of nuclear weapon tests in which it exploded the largest series of devices in the history of the testing of nuclear weapons. Those Soviet tests were begun despite the firm assertion by Premier Khrushchev in 1960 that the Soviet Government would not break its pledge not to be the first to test. He said in January 1960:

"I would like to re-emphasize that the Soviet Government, with a view to safeguarding the most favourable conditions for the working out in the very near future of an agreement on the discontinuation of tests, will continue to abide by its pledge not to renew experimental nuclear explosions in the Soviet Union if the Western Powers do not start testing atomic and hydrogen weapons."

Negotiations continued but then, unfortunately and finally, on 28 November 1961 the Soviet Government repudiated every part of the treaty that its negotiators, together with the negotiators from the United States and the United Kingdom, had laboured so diligently and patiently for over three years to achieve. And, again unfortunately, the Soviet Union has not changed its position since.

That was the second part of our negotiations.

In March 1962 negotiations were resumed at this Conference. In April the Soviet Union stated (ENDC/32) that it accepted the suggestions of the eight new members of the Conference as the basis for resumed negotiations. It did not give any further details of its position.

The United States also accepted the suggestions of the eight nations as one of the bases for negotiations, but not the exclusive one, and proceeded to determine in a detailed and concrete fashion how a system such as that outlined in their memorandum by the eight nations might work. We asked our scientists to make studies based on all technical advances of any sort, and to try to devise a workable system with a capability at least comparable to the system agreed upon with the Soviet Union in 1958 at the Geneva Conference of Experts.

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The United States has now proposed a revised verification system, based on new technical data obtained through much research. As I mentioned earlier, the essential aspects of these new data are the increase in long-range detection capability and the decrease in the number of earthquakes of a given magnitude. The verification system which the United States is prepared to consider if the obligation to facilitate on-site inspections is accepted by the Soviet Union would have the following main features:

First, there would be a network of nationally manned, internationally supervised stations to detect, locate and, wherever possible, identify seismic events. That network would involve substantially fewer stations than the 180 internationally operated stations dealing with detection in all environments which were called for under the system proposed (EXP/NUC/28) by the Geneva Conference of Experts, and which at one time both the Soviet and United States Governments accepted. Some of those stations might be existing ones, improved and equipped with modern, advanced standard instruments, but there definitely would need to be new ones, installed in properly located sites with the best guidance and help of the nations which would operate them as nationally manned stations under international supervision. The reason for that is clear. With only a modest number of stations it is important, for good detection, that they should be geographically well located, particularly in terms of detecting and, where possible, identifying events in seismic areas. Furthermore, it is important that all of this group of superior stations should be in suitable sites for maximum sensitivity.

Secondly, the staff of the stations would be nationals of the country in which the station was located, rather than non-nationals who had been hired and selected by the commission. The stations would be internationally supervised, but would retain their character as essentially national stations. They would, of course, record natural seismic events for the use of the operating country. They would contribute basic research information to the operating country and, through the international commission, to the entire world. This integrated network would be a fine research tool for use by scientists in all countries. Since a larger proportion of stations outside the nuclear countries would be reporting events within those countries, a somewhat lesser reliance would be placed upon the stations within those countries. The detection stations inside the territory of the nuclear Powers would,

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however, remain very important for the collection of data for the international system. The international commission must be able to process systematically and regularly the data received from all stations. For that reason the international supervision or monitoring by the commission must be of such a nature as to assure the rapid and reliable means of sending data to the commission; the continuous operation in accordance with the high scientific standards which the commission would be expected to prescribe; the additional training of national personnel according to agreed standards; the equipping of stations with the latest scientific instruments, calibrated according to standards which the commission would establish; and the locating of the control posts, after consultation with the commission, at quiet sites in regions satisfactory to the commission.

Thirdly, there would be a reduction of the number of on site inspections from the 12 to 20 proposed previously by the United States and the United Kingdom. This position of the United States is, I submit, wholly and totally consistent with the spirit of the eight-nation memorandum. That memorandum attempts to reach an accommodation of the fundamental interests of the parties. True, it uses the term "suspicious event", while I have used the term "unidentified events"; but when one considers that the process of identification is a process of elimination, all seismic events are suspicious which have been detected and located and not eliminated from consideration by being identified as earthquakes.

I should like to explain again to the members of this Conference how the United States position on the need for on-site inspection is based on scientific and political realities. The United States position is that present scientific knowledge does not enable one always to form a firm judgement that an event is of natural origin. Both underground explosions and earthquakes generate waves, and those waves travel through the earth and may be detected in many cases at great distances from the source of the disturbance. Those signals are transmitted through the very complicated layers of the earth and are drastically altered by the character of the earth through which they travel. For that reason the signals from both types of events are, when detected at a great distance, rather similar. In some cases, however, there are still enough properties of the source of the disturbance present in the signal so that one may determine that a signal has been generated by a natural event --- that is, an earthquake. For instance, one may be able to determine that an

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event has occurred at a great depth, and hence must be considered as natural; or one might be able to see that in some places the event has caused the earth surrounding the event to move first towards the origin of the disturbance. That would also indicate a natural event, since a man-made explosion could not cause a first motion of the earth to be towards the origin of the disturbance.

However, at this time, no certain way is known of determining that any particular signal has been positively generated by a nuclear explosion. Let me repeat that statement because it is very important: at this time, no certain way is known of determining that any particular signal has been positively generated by a nuclear explosion. Furthermore, many events detected by any control system will have their characteristics obscured by the seismic noise present at all detection stations and, therefore, no determination of the nature of the origin of the event will be possible. Such events are called "unidentified".

To summarize: it is our view that any system will be able to identify some events as earthquakes; there will be others that it will not be able to identify either as earthquakes or as nuclear explosions. We believe, therefore, that a verification system must include some on-site inspections to identify enough events to provide a reasonable assurance that the treaty is being observed.

The present position of the Soviet Union appears to be that distant seismic stations can in all cases both detect and identify the nature of a seismic event. To support that position, the Soviet representative, Mr. Zorin, has referred to the large Soviet and French underground tests. He spoke about the French tests at the last meeting of our nuclear Sub-Committee, when he said:

"The fact that sixty-five stations in the world, situated as far from the site of the explosion as Bolivia, Canada, Finland, Iran, Norway, Peru, Puerto Rico, Sweden and the United States, and in other countries, registered the underground explosion carried out by France in the Sahara confirms the fundamental conclusion that by national means of control it is quite possible not only to detect but also to identify any nuclear explosions, including underground ones." (ENDC/SC.I/PV.23, p.25).

Let us analyse most carefully this contention of Mr. Zorin's.

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The Soviet test of 2 February 1962 produced a seismic signal equivalent to magnitude 5.3. In hard rock -- the medium in which it is believed the test was conducted -- that would indicate an explosion of from 40 to 60 kilotons underground. That Soviet test of 2 February 1962 was located as coming from an area of low seismicity and, in particular, from an area previously identified as a nuclear test site.

The French underground test of 1 May 1962 produced a seismic signal of magnitude 5.2. In hard rock -- the medium in which it is believed the test was conducted -- that would indicate an explosion of from 30 to 50 kilotons. The French test also was located as coming from an aseismic area and also from an area previously identified as a test site.

We do not disagree with the inference which the Soviet representative draws from the Soviet and French tests if he implies merely that any large seismic signals picked up from an area in which earthquakes normally do not occur are highly suspicious as likely to have been made by nuclear explosions, particularly if they were located in an area already previously located as a test area. But we do emphatically disagree if it is attempted to infer from the experience with those two large explosions that distant seismic stations can be relied upon to identify the nature of all seismic events.

When he cited the French and Soviet underground tests Mr. Zorin did not discuss the underground test series conducted by the United States in the spring of 1962, which included over 40 shots. That was a significant test series and it included a large number of small nuclear shots in the low kiloton range. I should like to ask the representative of the Soviet Union to produce data from his country's national stations showing in how many of those cases they detected the United States tests. I should like also to ask him how many tests they detected only because those United States tests had been announced by the United States Press and radio. And I should like to ask him to produce data showing in how many instances Soviet Union stations could have determined from the seismic data alone that the event was a nuclear explosion and not an earthquake. In other words, how many of those tests were actually identified by seismic stations in the Soviet Union?

Let us assume that a potential violator did undertake a clandestine test in the most unlikely of all circumstances, by detonating a large device in the medium which

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produces the biggest seismic signal, in an aseismic area, and near an area identified as a test site. I submit that, even then, on-site inspections would be necessary. Of course, everybody would be suspicious that a country had violated the agreement by conducting a test. But what then? Would we want to take only the signals as proof? Would we want to enter into a treaty which allowed any party to denounce it and to resume testing simply because a seismic signal had occurred which, if investigated in an on-site inspection, might have turned out to be a natural event? Even in that very large area of the heartland of the Soviet Union where almost no earthquakes occur, a few earthquakes have indeed occurred. If such an unusual earthquake occurred would the parties to this treaty want to rest the entire fate of the treaty, which we would so laboriously have worked out, on the signals alone?

We submit that it would be decidedly unwise to allow the treaty to fall without an on-site investigation by an objective, international commission to determine the precise nature of such an event. It seems to us that this approach of the Soviet Union completely underestimates the solemn nature of the commitment undertaken by the States in entering into a treaty to ban all further nuclear tests. The United States views the necessity of on-site inspection for monitoring a test ban treaty which covers underground nuclear explosions as being reduced simply to a question of solid scientific and technical fact. A superior, well-operated detection system of distant stations for seismic events will every year detect numerous events in either the United States or the Soviet Union which it will not be able to identify. Since that is so, and if the world is to have confidence that the treaty is being obeyed, then some on-site inspections are necessarily required.

Unfortunately we have another difference with the Soviet Union in addition to our difference over the scientific facts about distinguishing between the seismic signals from explosions and earthquakes. That difference is the one regarding the precise nature of the obligation to facilitate on-site inspection. The fact that the Soviet Union is making such an issue over whether an inspection should be stated as an obligation suggests that the Soviet Union does not really think that there will be occasions when an on-site inspection will be needed.

The position of the Soviet Union appears to be that it will not accept inspection as part of a verification system unless the Soviet Union itself invites it. The Soviet Union appears to regard the obligation of inspection as an option to be

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honoured only if, at the time, the Soviet Union so desires. That is form, but not substance. Such a position is incompatible with the agreed principle that disarmament measures must have strict and effective international control to assure that all parties are honouring their obligations.

I am also aware of the finespun argument that, since the only remedy for a failure to permit an on-site inspection is to denounce the treaty, it is not even necessary to state an obligation to permit and facilitate an on-site inspection. Rather, so this argument goes, on-site inspection should be set forth in a treaty as entirely optional or by invitation. Failure by a State to issue the invitation when called for under the terms of the treaty would then shift to the other parties the onus of denouncing the treaty, with all the heavy consequences which that would entail. The denouncing parties then not only must bear the responsibility for scrapping the treaty but must also make the case for ending the treaty. They must do that with no opportunity to get the true evidence in the case by the only means possible: that is, objective, on-site inspection.

The consequences of this Soviet position on inspection are ominous. If the United States interprets the position of the Soviet Union correctly, the entire prospects for any progress in any field of disarmament are now placed in jeopardy. Essentially, the Soviet Union will not accept any reasonable system of verification. That is the implication of its total refusal to accept the obligation to facilitate an on-site inspection.

Let us apply this position of the Soviet Union to verification of other disarmament measures. Last Friday, 10 August, at the sixty-eighth meeting of this Committee, the Soviet representative made some interesting statements regarding the matter of verification of a reduction of armaments and verification of a halt in the production of such armaments. He said that, in order to verify the destruction of weapons, international inspectors should be at depots to witness destruction. He said that, in order to verify the stoppage and monitoring of production, international inspectors would have to be stationed at production plants (ENDC/PV.68, p24). Are we to assume that those inspectors are to be allowed at those depots and at those plants by invitation only? If the Soviet position on verification of a reduction in armaments is consistent with its position on verification of a nuclear test ban

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treaty, is the Soviet Union then really contending that any verification in a disarmament agreement can be by invitation only? It is important that we should all know if that is the real Soviet position.

The United States had thought that the Soviet Union, when it signed the joint statement of agreed principles in the summer of 1961, was accepting the obligation of verification. The Soviet Union accepted principle No. 6, which reads:

"6. All disarmament measures should be implemented from beginning to end under such strict and effective international control as would provide firm assurance that all parties are honouring their obligations ... " (ENDC/5, p.2)

It is completely inconsistent for the Soviet Union to accept the obligation of inspection in one kind of disarmament measure and to refuse to accept it in another kind of disarmament measure. The only apparent reason for its unwillingness to accept obligatory on-site inspection for a nuclear test ban treaty is -- or so it would appear -- that the Soviet Union does not really want a workable nuclear test ban agreement. Evidently, it does not want to stop testing its own nuclear weapons.

Let me conclude with a re-statement of the two basic differences which today prevent the signing of an agreement to end all our nuclear weapons tests in all environments for all time.

First, we have a difference about the facts; and I would certainly think that we ought to be able to resolve that difference. The United States believes that a superior, well operated detection system of distant stations for seismic events will every year detect numerous events in either the United States or the Soviet Union which it will not be able to identify, and that, in those cases, the source of the seismic signal can only be identified by an objective, on-site inspection. We have produced our reasons why we believe our contention is the correct one and we have scientists here, as have some of the other delegations, to discuss the matter in greater detail. The Soviet Union challenges the basic scientific fact that I have just given and states that in no case will on-site inspection be necessary to determine the source of seismic signal. It seems to me that that challenge places

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upon the Soviet Union a duty to present to the Conference here at Geneva the scientific data which it believes support its position, instead of making unsupported statements outside the Conference.

I note from the International Edition of The New York Times dated 11 August that Dr. A.M. Alexeyev, speaking to newsmen in Ottawa, Canada, stated that the Soviet Union had seismographic equipment capable of distinguishing all types of nuclear explosions from earthquakes. Now, of course we certainly have no objection to Dr. Alexeyev or any other Soviet scientist speaking in Ottawa; but the Sub-Committee on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests is meeting here in Geneva and we, and other delegations, have brought scientists here. If the Soviet Union really and truly believes that it has that capability then I submit that, in all candour, it should bring its scientists here to Geneva to demonstrate that capability to this Conference or the Sub-Committee instead of making statements outside our Conference which it is not willing to support before the assembly of distinguished scientists who are here in Geneva.

Secondly, we have a difference about accepting the obligation to facilitate an on-site inspection if one is called for under the treaty. The United States believes that all parties to the treaty should accept on-site inspection as an unquestioned obligation. But the Soviet Union believes that the conduct of an on-site inspection should be viewed only as optional or invitational. I submit that that is not satisfactory. The United States believes that it is contrary to the principle of adequate verification of disarmament measures "under strict and effective international control" which both the United States and the Soviet Union subscribed to in the joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations.

The United States sincerely regrets that efforts to make progress on a sound and effective treaty banning all nuclear tests in all environments so far have not yielded results. We urge the Soviet Union to examine carefully the consequences of the position it has taken here in Geneva. We hope that our Soviet colleague's words in the Sub-Committee on 9 August (ENDC/SC.I/PV.23, pp.19 et s.) do not represent his country's final conclusions on our proposal. The whole world is anxiously awaiting the result of our work here. We just cannot afford to permit this opportunity for a sound and workable nuclear test ban treaty to escape.

Mr. KUZNETSOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): First of all, I wish to express my gratitude to Mr. Dean for his kind words concerning me.

As for the Soviet Union, it is prepared to co-operate, and I am confident that if the United States side shows the same constructive approach to the solution of all the disarmament problems as is shown by the Soviet Union, we shall no doubt be able to achieve success very quickly and to prepare a treaty on general and complete disarmament within a very short period.

The Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament has met today to consider the problems relating to the discontinuance of nuclear tests. I should like to make some observations on the question under discussion. Since I have to join the ranks, so to speak, on the move, I shall naturally not be able to avoid repeating certain arguments and remarks which are already known. The problem under discussion is an important and complicated one and therefore, in order to have a better understanding of the positions of the parties, it will not be useless if some points are repeated.

Recently Mr. Dean has acquainted the members of the Committee with the changes which the United States intends to make in its previous positions on the aforesaid questions. Today he repeated these proposals (supra, p. 9) and put forward arguments in support of them. The United States Press and also certain United States statesmen have given wide publicity to these new moves of the United States, trying to create the impression that there have been very important changes in its position on the question of the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests. In his statements the United States representative pointed out in the Sub-Committee, and again today, that the changes which the United States intends to put forward are due to substantial technical developments which, firstly, have made it possible for the United States to carry out a reassessment of seismic detection capability as a result of improved methods of long-range detection and, secondly, have led to a considerable reduction, as compared with previous estimates, in the number of earthquakes comparable to underground nuclear tests of a certain magnitude. Technical developments had made it possible, according to Mr. Dean's statement, to make substantial changes in the position of the United States in regard to the terms of a treaty on the discontinuance of nuclear tests, provided, of course, that there is a sincere desire to solve this problem.

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We have carefully examined the United States proposals of which Mr. Dean informed the Committee, and we have sincerely tried to find something hopeful and rational in them. To our regret, we failed to do so, because there is nothing hopeful or rational in these proposals. Unfortunately, the position of the United States on the basic questions has in fact remained unchanged. The new proposals do not affect the essence of the propositions which have so far obstructed the conclusion of an agreement on the discontinuance of tests. Indeed, the United States continues to insist on the establishment of obligatory on-site inspection, emphasizing that acceptance of the obligatory nature of on-site inspection is a basic condition for the consideration of all the other proposals it puts forward in regard to an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear tests. It has been stated that the United States is prepared to consider a possible reduction in the number of on-site inspections, but the condition for such a reduction must be acceptance of the obligatory nature of on-site inspections. While putting forward conditions for reviewing the quota of obligatory on-site inspection, at the same time the United States demands an extension of the area which may be investigated when an inspection team goes to the site of a suspicious event.

As the United States representative informed us, the United States is also prepared to consider the possibility of a reduction in the number of observation posts, and the question of such posts being "nationally manned, internationally supervised stations", but again on condition that the other side accepts the obligatory nature of on-site inspections.

Thus we are faced in fact with an ultimatum-like demand on the part of the United States to the effect that if we do not accept its demand for obligatory on-site inspection, then the United States -- as is evident from Mr. Dean's statement -- will not even be prepared to consider other aspects of its own proposals regarding an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests.

It is legitimate to ask what difference there is between this new proposal of the United States and its previous position on on-site inspection. The only answer to this question is that there is no basic difference between the 'new position' of the United States and its previous position on the question of inspection.

The willingness of the United States to discuss reduction of the number or quota of obligatory on-site inspections of suspicious events does not alter the

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situation. Moreover, this willingness, as we have already pointed out, is conditional. It is obvious that with such an approach all other proposals, besides, I may say, the ultimatum-like demand for obligatory on-site inspection, are of no practical significance whatsoever.

The United States must know very well that the Soviet Union will not agree, any more than it did in the past, to accept proposals which under one pretext or another would give the other side the right to carry out intelligence work in the Soviet Union under the guise of inspection. Therefore the putting forward of previous, already rejected proposals regarding the nature of on-site inspection has no other purpose than to lead the negotiations into a deadlock and thus prevent the achievement of an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear tests.

Let us now consider the problem of control posts. Although the representative of the United States says that the United States is prepared to give up international control posts for the detection of nuclear explosions, on which it had previously insisted, it has put forward at the same time a demand for the establishment of a world-wide network of control posts, consisting of national stations, under international supervision. According to the explanations of the United States representative, this "international supervision" would be for the purpose of seeing that the stations are properly serviced and calibrated, that the staff of these stations are properly trained and that the stations function in the proper way. As we gather from the explanations of the United States representative, the intention is to establish effective international control over the work of national stations. The representative of the United States stressed that there should be international supervision of a nature to ensure effective international control.

But what does establishing effective international control over the work of national stations mean? It is not difficult to guess that if such control is established these national stations would become de facto international rather than national establishments. It would mean in practice that the most important questions of the work of these stations and of control in regard to their staff would be decided by an international body, in which the Western Powers intend of course to play the leading role. Thus the "new" United States proposal on control posts under "effective international control" means in fact a demand for the establishment of a network of international posts, only in a somewhat different form in comparison with what was previously proposed by the United States.

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Our conclusion that the United States continues to adhere to its previous position on the question of control posts is confirmed by President Kennedy himself. To the question put by a correspondent at a Press Conference on 1 August: "Has the new information we've turned up from our underground tests affected our position on the need for international control stations on Soviet territory?" the President replied in the negative. He said: "No. I think that our position, which Mr. Dean will elaborate, has been that national control posts should be internationally monitored and supervised."

The Soviet Union has steadfastly striven and continues to strive for the prohibition of all nuclear explosions -- in the atmosphere, in outer space, under water and underground -- and has submitted a number of specific proposals in this regard. I shall now refer to one of them. It must be recalled in this connexion that on 28 November 1961 the Soviet Government put forward a new proposal (ENDC/11), being anxious to extricate this problem from the deadlock that had come about. However, the United States continued to insist on its unacceptable proposals providing for obligatory inspection, and refused to accept the Soviet Union's proposal concerning the use of national means of detection.

The Soviet Union has shown and continues to show readiness to consider any constructive proposals leading to the solution of the problem of banning nuclear weapon tests. It is the opinion of the Soviet Government that the initiative of the eight non-aligned members of the Committee in trying to find a new compromise basis for agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear tests deserves to be fully approved.

The non-aligned States, as you know, proposed in their joint memorandum (ENDC/28) that a system for continuous observation and control over the discontinuance of all nuclear tests might be based and built upon "already existing national networks of observation posts and institutions". For the purpose of thorough and objective examination of all available data, the memorandum provides for the establishment of an international commission consisting of a limited number of highly qualified scientists entrusted with the task of processing the data received from the national observation posts, and of reporting on any nuclear

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explosion or suspicious event. An important provision is that the parties to the treaty and the commission should consult as to what further measures of clarification, if necessary, would facilitate the assessment of the nature of a significant event. Moreover the parties to the treaty could invite the commission to visit their territories and/or the site of the event the nature of which was in doubt. Thus, on the question of inspection a new constructive basis was put forward.

In submitting their memorandum the non-aligned States made it abundantly clear that the success of further negotiations would depend to a considerable extent upon acceptance of the basic principles contained in this memorandum. They pointed out that their memorandum should not be used by the nuclear Powers as a means of strengthening old positions which hinder the reaching of an agreement. Stressing the compromise nature of their proposal, the eight non-aligned countries stated that on the basis of their memorandum it was possible to achieve an early agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests.

From the statements made by the representatives of the non-aligned countries it is quite evident that they all attach ever-increasing importance to the principles put forward by them, which must constitute the basis of an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear tests.

In his brilliant speech at the meeting of the Eighteen Nation Committee on 24 July, Mr. Krishna Menon, the Minister for Defence of India, speaking on the necessity of reaching agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests, pointed out that it was:

"... possible for all practical purposes to detect these tests through the monitoring by national stations of tests outside their territory..."

(ENDC/PV.60, p. 8)

Mr. Krishna Menon stressed that the provisions of the eight-nation memorandum are fully justified by the latest scientific research developments.

The representatives of Burma (ENDC/PV.65, p. 15), Ethiopia (ENDC/PV.67, p. 56) and India (ibid., p. 25) quite recently have particularly noted the scientific basis of the provisions of the memorandum and its effectiveness at the present time.

In order to move the question of the discontinuance of nuclear tests out of the impasse which it had reached, the Soviet Union agreed to accept the proposals

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of the eight non-aligned countries as the basis on which a treaty on the discontinuance of such tests could be worked out, although some provisions of this memorandum did not entirely correspond to the position of the Soviet Union.

However, the United States and the United Kingdom refused to accept this memorandum as the basis for agreement. They stated, and Mr. Dean has stated today, that they accept this memorandum only as "one of the bases" for negotiations.

Therefore, while the Soviet Union has moved over to a new basis in the negotiations for the conclusion of a treaty on the discontinuance of tests -- the basis proposed by the eight non-aligned States -- the United States continues to adhere to its old position, refusing in fact to accept the proposals set forth in the eight-nation memorandum.

The United States representative is trying to make out that the so-called new proposals of the United States correspond to the eight-nation memorandum -- he stressed this again today -- just as he asserted that the former proposals of the United States were, allegedly, in accord with the principles contained in this memorandum. In so doing, the representatives of the United States and of some of its allies have taken upon themselves, I think, the ungrateful task of trying to find something in the memorandum which is not there. They are trying to adjust the memorandum to their own tune and to infuse into it a purport which would justify the United States position regarding the terms of an agreement to cease tests.

The United States representative has given a great deal of attention to analysing the memorandum from legal and even grammatical points of view, trying thereby to becloud a perfectly clear issue. I shall not deal with this aspect of the discussion. I can only remark that the attempt to distort the substance of the memorandum's basic provisions cannot contribute to fruitful negotiations on the cessation of tests. The requirement that a system of obligatory on-site inspection should be established does not follow from the memorandum, no matter how one tries to prove the opposite. I emphasize this. On the contrary, the provisions of the memorandum quite clearly and unequivocally refute the assertions about the complete accord of the United States proposals with the proposals of the eight non-aligned countries.

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The representatives of the United States, in order to justify their negative attitude, attempt to ignore and to leave out of account the achievements of science and technology in detecting nuclear explosions. They claim that the scientific and technological means of detection available to States do not guarantee control over an agreement; therefore, they say, a danger exists that obligations assumed under a treaty on the cessation of nuclear tests may be violated and that such tests may be carried out in secrecy. The existing facts testify to the contrary. For instance, the recent French underground nuclear explosion in the Sahara was detected and registered, as Mrs. Myrdal said on 1 August (ENDC/PV.64, p. 13) by sixty-five stations which recorded this underground explosion and submitted reports on it.

It is known that in December 1961 in the State of New Mexico, the United States carried out, in special conditions, an underground nuclear explosion with the code name "Gnome". This explosion was immediately detected and identified by Swedish, Japanese, Soviet and other detection stations. One can also cite the case of the underground nuclear explosion carried out in the Soviet Union at the beginning of this year which the United States Atomic Energy Commission reported immediately.

At the same time, it is necessary to bear in mind that the techniques of detection and identification are progressing. This is recognized in the report circulated by the United States Department of Defense on the results of Project Vela, in which it is stated that methods have been found to increase the sensitivity of instruments for seismic detection by from five to ten times and that "with the use of special filtering techniques, improvement in sensitivity somewhat greater than that previously considered possible can be obtained" (ENDC/45, p. 1).

The unwillingness of the United States to accept the memorandum as the basis for agreement shows that the United States does not want to conclude an agreement, that it seeks to escape being tied down in regard to nuclear weapon tests. In the ruling circles of the United States they do not even make any secret of this, nor do they conceal the fact that the United States intends to continue experimental explosions in the future and to intensify the nuclear arms race. In this connexion, attention should be paid to the statements made by Mr. Thomas, a member of the United States House of Representatives, which has already been mentioned in the Sub-Committee (ENDC/SC.I/PV.23, p. 28). As we know, Mr. Thomas said openly that the United States cannot renounce its further tests of nuclear weapons, and gave as his reason that the United States has to secure for itself the leading position in the field of nuclear weapons.

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After this statement, Senator Kuchel, Assistant Republican Leader in the Senate, stated on 7 August that President Kennedy should order additional nuclear tests to guarantee the superiority of the United States in the nuclear field.

In the light of the foregoing, Mr. Dean's statement on 9 August at the meeting of the three-Power Sub-Committee (ibid., p.34), to the effect that the United States is supposedly prepared to stop nuclear weapon testing immediately, if the Soviet Union stops its tests, sounds strange, to say the least.

Mr. Dean is well aware that on 28 November 1961, the Soviet Government submitted a draft treaty on the immediate cessation of all nuclear tests. If the United States is really prepared to conclude on such a basis an agreement to stop nuclear tests, this will not involve any difficulty for the Soviet Union. We are ready to do so at this very moment. We have also said repeatedly that we are prepared to conclude an agreement on the basis of the memorandum of the eight non-aligned countries. The United States position, however, prevents an agreement being reached on the cessation of tests on the basis of the memorandum of the eight non-aligned countries.

The "new proposals" which Mr. Dean reported to us cannot serve as the basis for agreement. If the United States wants to see any progress in the negotiations for the cessation of tests, it should reconsider its position on this question and accept as the basis the proposals of the non-aligned States without any reservations. We cannot allow endless debate to go on without any hope of success while the explosions polluting our planet are also going on.

It is essential to make every effort to reach agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests. The continuation of nuclear bomb explosions will be more and more dangerous for all peoples and will be fraught with serious consequences. By refusing to conclude an agreement on the basis of the memorandum submitted by the eight non-aligned countries, the United States is assuming a heavy responsibility for the consequences of such a step, which is contrary to the requirements of our time.

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, it will, as before, spare no efforts to achieve the solution of this urgent problem -- the conclusion of an agreement to put an end to explosions in the atmosphere, in outer space, under water and underground, which endanger people's lives.

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

We have just heard a lengthy statement by the representative of the United States. We shall study this statement, but I consider it necessary to make a few preliminary remarks.

Mr. Dean dealt with the background of the negotiations for a nuclear test ban. Everybody remembers the background of this question, and I do not think there is any need to take our Conference back to that period of three years ago. I can say that in any case it is not the Soviet Union that bears the responsibility for the fact that an agreement on a nuclear test ban has not so far been signed. The responsibility for that rests entirely with the United States. I will remind you of one point to illustrate my thesis.

The discussions on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests began on 31 October 1958. For two months in 1958 the discussions made very good progress. Many essential articles of a draft treaty were agreed upon, and it was considered that the Conference ought quickly to come to an understanding and that the other articles would be quickly agreed on, and that, at the beginning of 1959 at the latest, the treaty could be signed. Suddenly, if I am not mistaken, on 5 January 1959, the United States side submitted a so-called "new proposal". It stated that the recommendations which had been worked out by the experts in 1958 were no good, that those recommendations were insufficient and that further study was needed. Then the merry-go-round started. Since then the United States has been raising one obstacle after another on the path to an agreement. This is certainly the main reason why we are still marking time.

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, as I have already mentioned and can repeat once more, it is ready to consider any constructive proposals which actually lead to speeding up the solution of this problem. Mr. Dean, spoke just now at considerable length on the results of scientific research in the United States of America, and said that the Government had sent a group of experts to Geneva. We have all due respect for scientists and research and, of course, you do not need to teach the Soviet Union to respect scientists and science. We are gathered here to consider a political problem. But the United States delegation is making an attempt to divert the attention of the Committee from the basic issues and is striving to get us involved in a discussion of the controversies going on among the scientists. That is a sure way to delay the solution of this problem for many years.

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I will give just one illustration. As is well known, at the beginning of 1959 the scientists of the United States pleaded that they had insufficient data and that the data at their disposal showed that the conclusions of the experts in 1958 were too optimistic. They said that explosions could be concealed, especially in hard rock such as salt or granite. That was in January 1959. After that we had discussions for three years, and now Mr. Dean has submitted to us a report on the results of Project Vela. What does this say? It says that hard rock such as salt or granite increases the signal size by about a factor of two. Moreover, this is a very conservative estimate. We have the statements of United States scientists that this kind of rock increases the signal strength not twice but a greater number of times. What do you want our Committee to do? Surely you do not wish to suggest that we should take sides between your scientists? This is obviously calculated to divert the attention of the Committee from the essence of the problem and start an endless discussion on this question.

You may plead that you also have scientists who are opposed to the ending of tests. I need only remind you of one of your scientists, Mr. Teller, who enjoys a considerable reputation. He considers it quite idiotic that the United States should conduct negotiations on the possibility of discontinuing tests. Moreover, his book was published quite recently and has had considerable support in official circles. I do not want to go into that, because I consider that if we go along that path and take that approach as our basis we shall doom our Conference to endless sterile discussion.

Nor can I ignore Mr. Dean's statement that the Soviet Union was carrying out nuclear explosions while the United States was not. The Soviet Government has more than once stated its position on this question quite clearly. The Soviet Union is opposed to the continuance of the arms race; the Soviet Union is opposed to the continuance of nuclear weapon tests; but the Soviet Union must be mindful of its own security. It is not its own enemy. If the other side carries on an arms race, if the other sides threatens, if the other side intends to settle certain outstanding problems by the use of force, what do you expect us to do? Neither history nor our people would forgive us if we did otherwise; we are compelled to strengthen our security only because the Western Powers are carrying on an arms race. How are peace-loving States to react when it is now being stated officially in the United States, and moreover at the highest level, that in certain circumstances the initiative might be taken to unleash a nuclear war?

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

Many official persons are talking about the need to draw up with all speed plans for a preventive war, and propose the use of force in order to settle outstanding international problems. Do you expect the Soviet Union to disarm in these circumstances? No, that is impossible. And the Soviet Union must, of course, keep careful watch on the development of the international situation. Responsibility to the Soviet people and to all peace-loving peoples compels the Soviet Government to keep its means of defence at the proper level.

One can say that the fixed idea in Mr. Dean's statement today and in his previous statements is obligatory on-site inspection. I must say that this fixed idea runs like a bright-coloured thread through all our discussions. Here Mr. Dean has lifted the veil a little, although this secret was already known before. It is important to the United States to secure by hook or by crook acceptance of the idea that inspection must be obligatory. It is important to the United States in order that the very same idea can be subsequently extended to the discussion of the question of general and complete disarmament. What is the motive behind this? Do you think that the motive behind it is the need for security, the need for control? Not at all. Nor is any secret made about it in the United States. The motive lies in the demands of the Pentagon; in the demands of those circles which want by hook or by crook to look into someone else's house and to find out there what they want to know so as to be able to work out even more successfully their plans for aggression and a preventive war. The insistent demand of the United States for obligatory inspection is not based on any need. Obligatory inspection should not be made an ultimatum-like condition for signing an agreement on the basis of the memorandum of the eight non-aligned countries.

I want to appeal once again to the United States delegation and to Mr. Dean to examine everything carefully, to take into account all the changes that have taken place in the world in the past three years, to take into account the facts which we now have and to take the path of really constructive work. The Soviet Union is prepared to sign even immediately an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests on the basis of the memorandum of the eight non-aligned States.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): First let me add my congratulations to the Soviet Union on its remarkable achievements in space of which we have been reading in the past few days. We are all very much impressed by them, and we certainly wish the Soviet Union further success in that field. Secondly let me say how glad I too am to welcome Mr. Kuznetsov to join us in our deliberations here. We shall study with the greatest care and interest all such comments as he may choose to make to us, just as I have studied his comments this morning, on which I hope to say a word as I make my own remarks. Thirdly, perhaps I might be allowed to say how sorry we are to think that we shall be losing Mr. Zorin from our midst. It will be a real loss to many of us and I shall miss him very much, but I shall look forward to seeing him at other gatherings. I hope the rumour I have heard is not true --- that in fact he is going back to Moscow to be the next cosmonaut. If he is, I only hope he will choose an orbit that goes over Geneva and that he will think of us each time he passes overhead. That would give us immense encouragement.

I have listened with great care to what Mr. Kuznetsov said in the course of his remarks here this morning, and I am sorry to find myself straight away to a certain extent in disagreement with him, because I understood him to say right at the beginning of his speech, with reference to the United States proposals:

"... we have sincerely tried to find something hopeful and rational in them. To our regret, we failed to do so, because there is nothing hopeful or rational in these proposals." (supra, p. 23)

I disagree, I disagree entirely and fundamentally, and I shall seek to show why.

The United Kingdom Government believes that the elements of an agreement on a nuclear test ban treaty do now exist if there is the will on both sides to achieve it. I affirm my faith that those principles, those possibilities, those elements do exist, and I should like to try to generate hope in this Committee rather than despair such as Mr. Kuznetsov's speech seemed to imply. That that hope should exist and prove to be justified is very important indeed; it is important for reasons which have been expressed on other occasions in this Conference more eloquently than I can hope to express them, but I do want to underline just one reason. If it should prove impossible to reach an agreement on a nuclear test ban -- an agreement which after all requires a minimum of verification -- then what rational expectation could

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we as honest men have, what expectation could the world have, that we could reach agreement on general and complete disarmament, which, as has already been shown so many times here, requires very much more rigorous verification and involves much more complicated aspects of national defence? That really is a primary fact which we have to face.

We have heard today a statement by our colleague from the United States on the new scientific information which United States and United Kingdom research has made available. The United Kingdom wants to use that information to draw up an acceptable treaty banning all nuclear tests in all environments for all time. We want to share that information with our partners in negotiation, to find out whether any other delegation has any better information and, through a pooling of the best scientific information we all have, to arrive at the best result. Our colleagues will have had the opportunity of reading the verbatim record (ENDC/SC.I/PV.23) of the meeting of the Sub-Committee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests of 9 August. I should like to try to clarify the position a little further, and in the light of the comments made, in particular by our new Soviet colleague at the end of his speech, I feel it absolutely necessary to refer once more to the background against which all this is set.

In 1958 experts from the Soviet Union -- just as much as experts from the United States and the United Kingdom, and from other countries, of course -- reached a set of agreed principles (EXP/NUC/28) which their Government then endorsed. With regard to detection the agreed principle was that there should be 180 detection posts around the world. Those detection posts were to be operated by an international commission. With regard to inspection, every unidentified event was to be liable to inspection by the commission. In subsequent negotiations it was agreed between the three Governments that at each detection post in the territory of the nuclear Powers there should be about 30 technicians, 10 from the host country and 20 foreigners.

In the course of three years' negotiations from 1958 to 1961 the United Kingdom and the United States made wide concessions to the Soviet point of view. And I would inform Mr. Kuznetsov that that did not all happen in those early months, as he led us to believe: it happened very largely over the period 1959-1960, through patient, long, exhausting negotiations. At that time the Soviet Government said that it would not like any foreigners on Soviet soil, whether in detection posts or in inspection

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teams, and in a spirit of compromise in order to take account of Soviet wishes, the two Western Governments agreed that instead of every unidentified event in the Soviet Union being liable to inspection, which would have meant 100 or more inspections a year in the Soviet Union alone, there should only be 20, as we said at first -- later we offered a sliding scale of between 12 and 20 inspections a year. As a compromise on detection posts the Western Governments agreed that 10 out of the 30 technicians at each post should be foreign nationals. To that the Soviet Government agreed at that time. The Western Governments also reduced their request on the number of detection posts in the Soviet Union from 25 to 19. The Soviet Union offered 15, so we were not very far apart in numbers and we were fully agreed in principle at that time.

The Western position, therefore, when the Western draft treaty (ENDC/9) was tabled in April 1961 was that there should be 19 permanent detection posts in the Soviet Union with 20 foreigners out of a total of 30 persons at each post. In other words, there were to be 380 foreign technicians operating permanent detection posts in the Soviet Union. As regards inspection, the West was asking for a maximum -- a maximum -- of 20 inspections a year. Since an inspection team was estimated to consist of about 6 foreign technicians, that would have meant inspection visits by 120 foreign technicians a year. On the other hand the Soviet Union was at that time prepared to accept, as I have said, 15 detection posts, which would have meant 300 foreign technicians operating permanent detection posts on Soviet territory. The Soviet Union was also prepared to accept three inspections a year, which would have meant about 18 foreign technicians visiting Soviet territory. I was therefore very puzzled when Mr. Kuznetsov said so vehemently just now that of course there could be no question of having foreign nationals on Soviet territory, and indicated that all this was at the instigation of the Pentagon. If the Pentagon is such a frightening thing today, why was it not so when these things were being discussed in the past? Surely he cannot mean that the Soviet Union was not discussing this matter sincerely when it agreed to those particular points?

I want to be absolutely clear on these facts. I think they are important. On 31 May 1961 the Soviet negotiator at those talks, Mr. Tsarapkin, said:

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"First of all I must say that even before the start of the present political Conference of the three Powers the Soviet Government declared that it fully agreed with the conclusions and recommendations of the 1958 Geneva Conference of Experts which had worked out a system of control over the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests. Consequently, even before the start of our Conference, the Soviet Government had publicly declared that it accepted the methods of detecting and identifying nuclear explosions and the system of control worked out and recommended by the Conference of Experts." (GEN/DNT/PV.313, p.9)

On the same day Mr. Tsarapkin said:

"Our disagreement with you over the number of on-site inspection teams to be dispatched for the purpose of establishing whether a nuclear explosion or a natural event has occurred does not at all mean that we are opposed to on-site inspection as a measure of control." (ibid., p.12)

Again, on control posts, Mr. Tsarapkin said:

"Our rejection of your proposal to establish nineteen control posts on USSR territory does not mean at all that we oppose control. ... I repeat once more that our agreement to fifteen control posts on the territory of the Soviet Union still holds." (ibid., pp. 9 and 10)

Those were control posts with 20 foreign nationals at each post, as will be recalled. That was the position on 31 May last year. The Soviet Union was proposing that there should be 15 permanent detection posts in the Soviet Union, containing 300 foreigners, and three inspections in the Soviet Union, involving about 18 foreigners. Those are facts. That is what the Soviet Union then agreed.

Some people say that the attitude of the Soviet Government on the presence of foreigners on Soviet territory, in detection posts and in inspection teams, changed as a result of the U-2 incident at the time of the Summit Conference in May 1960; but, as I have said, it was one year later, on 31 May 1961, when the Soviet representative in Geneva said clearly and categorically that the Soviet Union still admitted both those principles. It was not until 28 November 1961 that the Soviet Government, which by that time had resumed nuclear testing on a massive scale, said that it was no longer prepared to admit any foreigners in the operation of detection posts in the Soviet Union or any foreigners visiting Soviet territory for nuclear test inspections. It was that change of attitude on the part of the Soviet Union which caused the present deadlock.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

Mr. Kuznetsov said this morning:

"...the Soviet Union will not agree, any more than it did in the past, to accept proposals which under one pretext or another would give the other side the right to carry out intelligence work in the Soviet Union under the guise of inspection." (supra, p.24)

But the Soviet Union did accept the proposals in the past and has never yet told us why it will not accept them now. What reason has the Soviet Government given us for this change? The only reason it gives now is that the Soviet Government now possesses techniques which it claims are capable of identifying all seismic events, and for that reason it says that the presence of foreigners in the operation of detection posts in the Soviet Union, or of any on-site inspection at all, is unnecessary.

In reply to this claim of the Soviet Government that the Soviet Union now has techniques capable of identifying all events, we have said many times, and I repeat today, "We for our part have no such capability. But, if the Soviet Union has, will you show it to us? Will you substantiate your claim, and then possibly on-site inspection will become unnecessary? We do not know. We have brought our scientists to Geneva. They are here to talk this over with you. Please bring yours, and if you have these instruments, these techniques, please explain them to us, then there might not need to be any further problem." As I say, we do have our experts here in Geneva, present in this room at this moment. I hope the Soviet delegation will tell us that, in response to our previous invitations, it has Soviet scientists present also. I understand that there are scientists here from certain other countries represented at this table. I am very glad to know that. Let them put their heads together and, as soon possible, tell us the result of their talks. It is no good Mr. Kuznetsov's saying that, in fact, that would not get us anywhere, and would only bemuse and distract us. The fact is that up until 28 November last year we did have an agreed basis for our discussions, and that agreed basis was a basis scientifically agreed between us. Why is the Soviet Union afraid to try and achieve the same now? So many problems could be solved if only the Soviet Union would co-operate with us in this field.

Apparently we have no knowledge that there are any Soviet scientists in Geneva ready to talk with ours, and I regret that profoundly. We all have a deep respect

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for the achievement of Soviet scientists. I have already today indicated my admiration for their feat in placing two men in orbit around the world at the same time for several days. We feel sure that if Soviet scientists can accomplish that then they must have much of interest to tell us about detection and identification of nuclear tests. But without their presence, without their co-operation, we must make the best progress we can with the information available to us, and it really is not for them to criticize us for not having that information if they have it themselves and refuse to give it to us.

Our new information, which the United States representative has enlarged upon today, enables us to offer a new position both on detection posts and on inspection. We accept the principle that detection posts can be operated by home country nationals and we envisage only some element of monitoring or supervision by the international commission. In this context I will again take issue with Mr. Kuznetsov. In his speech this morning Mr. Kuznetsov tried to define this in different terms. He said:

"It would mean in practice that the most important questions of the work of such stations and of control in regard to their staff would be decided by an international body, in which the Western Powers intend of course to play the leading role. Thus the 'new' United States proposal on control posts under 'effective international control' means in fact a demand for the establishment of a network of international posts, only in a somewhat different form in comparison with what was previously proposed by the United States." (supra. p.24)

I tell him that is not my conception of it at all.

Mr. Kuznetsov quoted today what President Kennedy said at his Press conference when he talked about the question of international monitoring or supervision. He made the same mistake as Mr. Zorin did the other day, when I sought to correct him (ENDC/SC.I/PV.23, p. 34). As I understand it, Mr. Kennedy said "internationally monitored or supervised". Mr. Kuznetsov said "monitored and supervised" (supra. p.25). There seems to be an attempt to make it appear that there has been no advance when, in fact, there has. I deeply deplore this attitude because we must try to find areas of agreement and not areas of disagreement.

In his speech on 9 August in the nuclear Sub-Committee (ENDC/SC.I/PV.23) Mr. Zorin said that in this matter the Western countries were standing on their

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old position. He said that there had been no qualitative change, no change in substance in the Western attitude. As I have said, that is patently not true. A change in numbers, of course, could be extremely important. In the other context in which we meet here, in the disarmament context, our Soviet colleagues lay stress on the fact that a change in reduction of conventional forces from 2.1 million to 1.9 million which they offered would be an important change. I agree with that, but in this case it is not only a change in numbers. In the case we are now talking about it is a change of principle; in my view, a total and complete change. Far from standing on old positions we are proposing something quite new, which is wholly in line with the proposals in the eight-Power memorandum. How would these detection posts be fitted into a system such as that proposed in the eight-Power memorandum? The memorandum says:

"Such a system might be based and built upon already existing national networks of observation posts and institutions or, if more appropriate, on certain of the existing posts designated by agreement for the purpose together, if necessary, with new posts established by agreement.

... Improvements could no doubt be achieved by furnishing posts with more advanced instrumentation." (ENDC/28, p.1)

That language is familiar to us all by now, I am sure. But that is more or less what we are proposing in relation to detection posts. Furthermore the eight-Power memorandum talks of the need to entrust the commission with the task of processing all data from the agreed system of observation posts. Perhaps I could refer to what I myself said in the nuclear Sub-Committee on 9 August in relation to this question of detection posts:

"On the precise relations between the international commission and national detection posts necessary to ensure the requisite high degree of accuracy and uniformity, I think it should be possible to bring the positions of the two sides closer together. As far as the United Kingdom delegation is concerned, we naturally want to look at that and to discuss the problem but our position is that the degree of supervision should be no more than is clearly shown to be necessary to ensure that results from a station play their part in providing an adequate world-wide coverage on which the international commission would feel fully able to rely. We want to explore this matter. We should like, with the assistance of our scientists and those of other delegations, to take into account in this context the suggestions which were made by the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, at the sixty-fourth plenary meeting held on 1 August." (ENDC/SC.I/PV.23, pp. 16-17)

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

In my view, there is a field for discussion and negotiation in which surely agreement ought not to be too difficult to reach. It requires the will, and I believe that with the will it is certainly possible.

Among the points for discussion in the light of the new detection data would be the number of detection posts required throughout the world. The Geneva system provided for 180 detection posts (EXP/NUC/28, annex VII, para.3), all of which included seismic detection. The new data suggests that for seismic detection alone a very much smaller number of posts would be required, assuming such posts to be equipped with the best possible recording techniques and assuming that they can be located in the most favourable environment. But before a complete system can be decided upon, in terms of station numbers and their location, it is necessary to consider the capabilities and to examine the joint location possibilities for all those methods, other than seismic, which have already been agreed upon as essential to monitoring a nuclear test ban. It does appear to us, however, that the total number of stations required for all methods of detection and identification of nuclear tests would still be very much smaller than that required by the system proposed by the Geneva Committee of Experts in 1958. Additionally we foresee the possibility of improving the total seismic capability of a system by providing for the reception of data as required from existing seismological facilities of approved standards of performance. All this must, of course, be a matter for discussion and negotiation.

I turn now to the issue of inspection. The new data indicate that there will be substantially fewer earthquakes that provide signals equivalent to an underground nuclear explosion of a given yield than hitherto expected. That means that there will be fewer earthquakes that might be mistaken for possible underground nuclear explosions and therefore, of course, a smaller number of inspections required. But unless the Russians have methods which they have not yet explained to us, unless they can provide that information, then there will still be a residue of underground events which will be detected and located to within a comparatively small area but which it will still be impossible for the commission to identify without on-site inspection.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

I want to be very clear about this because if the Soviet Union does know scientific methods of identification which would leave no residue of unidentified events we earnestly invite it to show us how it could be done. Is that such an unreasonable request? Why do we never get any response when we ask such simple questions? If such techniques really exist, then there ought no longer to be any problem. The commission could use those techniques, and every event would be identified without the necessity for on-site inspection. But, for our part, we hope that with continued scientific research that happy moment will in due course be reached; and, at the worst, we hope that the necessity for any on-site inspection need only be temporary. This is such a key point, it seems to me; if the Soviet Union can help us with information to overcome this problem we can obviate the necessity now. If the Soviet Union will help us and work with us then it may not be long before we can all be agreed that that is in fact the state of affairs. And once that was so, then we could all agree to eliminate on-site inspections. But we have to base ourselves on the scientific facts as we know them, to the best of our ability, and our position remains that as long as there is a residue of events which the commission cannot identify without on-site inspection there must be an obligation on the parties to the treaty to accept on-site inspection. That is an obligation which we are ready to accept ourselves, and which we have always been ready to accept. The important thing about the new data is that it enables us to agree to a smaller number of inspections than we could have accepted before.

There has been a good deal of discussion in the Sub-Committee on nuclear tests of the question whether the eight Power memorandum provides for an obligation on States Members to accept on-site inspection by the commission if the commission cannot otherwise establish the truth about an event. I do not want to embark this morning upon a further discussion on the interpretation of documents; our discussions have been in the records over a long period of time. I would only say that it seems to me evident that if the commission decided that it could not establish the truth about an event without on-site inspection, and if a State refused a request from the commission for on-site inspection, that State would not be giving the commission the speedy and full co-operation required by the last sentence of paragraph 5 of the memorandum.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

I recall that on 2 April the representative of Burma, Mr. Barrington, used a very eloquent phrase which struck me at the time. He said:

"After all, however good they may be, the instruments which record the events do not get up and speak; What they do is to record data which trained personnel interpret. It is therefore not inconceivable that interpretations may differ. How would a difference of this kind be resolved unless there were in existence some impartial international scientific body acceptable to all the nuclear Powers whose function would be to settle such disputes, if necessary after making such inquiries and inspections as may be considered by it to be essential?"

(ENDC/PV.13, p. 7)

I also noted the statement made on 9 May by the representative of Sweden, Mr. Edberg, who said:

"The third principle, concerning the relations between the parties to the treaty and the commission, their consultations, the obligations of the parties to co-operate with the commission by furnishing it with the necessary data on events in doubt and by inviting on-site verification when required, should also open the door to constructive and fruitful detailed negotiations." (ENDC/PV.34, p. 22)

But we must be realistic in regard to this problem. Whatever the views held by one delegation or another at this table, the essential point is that the great nuclear Powers should agree; they must agree. What are the respective positions of the two sides at the moment? The West has moved from asking for on-site inspection for all unidentified events, originally estimated at 100 or more annually in the Soviet Union, first to a figure of 20 a year, next to a sliding scale of between 12 and 20, and now, in the light of the new data, to offering to discuss a still smaller figure as long as, but only as long as, there will still be a residue of events which the commission cannot identify otherwise. Thus we shall hold out the hope -- and certainly the desire -- that we may achieve the position where our scientific knowledge will enable us to do away with even that. But we have not arrived at that position yet. In other words, we have made a steady progression of offers likely to be progressively easier for the Soviet Union to accept.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

What is the Soviet Union position? The Soviet Government is at present standing on its extreme position -- and I use the word "extreme" advisedly -- of 28 November 1961, which is to accept no compulsory international inspection whatever. The ground for that position is the claim that techniques exist which can identify all events, but the Soviet Union declines to demonstrate those instruments to us or to provide us with any supporting records. This, of course, is not an old Soviet position; it is a much more extreme position than the old position. The Soviet Union accuses us sometimes of resting on our old position, but the old Soviet position -- old, but still as recent as August 1961 -- was to accept the principle of on-site inspection and to agree to three such inspections a year. If the Soviet Union would even go back to that old position we should at least then have agreement on the principle of on-site inspection. But it has moved away from its old position to a more extreme position, and it has never explained to us why the terrible dangers of espionage to which they refer in connexion with this very small number of inspections is so much worse now than it would have been prior to 28 November last year. The Soviet Union has never explained to us why that would be so much more terrible than the thousands of inspectors which it seems ready to envisage in relation to general and complete disarmament. I just do not understand this argument.

That is the summing-up of the situation as I see it. On detection the West now accepts completely the principle that detection posts may be operated by nationals of the country concerned. That is a qualitative change of position, a change of principle. On inspection we are willing to discuss still smaller numbers. That is a quantitative change, but, as I said earlier, changes of number can be important, and very important. In the field of general and complete disarmament our Soviet colleague argues, and argues rightly, that changes of number are changes of importance.

But what attitude did Mr. Zorin take at our Sub-Committee meeting on 9 August? His answer to these new proposals by the West was to try to prove that they involved nothing new, no qualitative changes, no changes of substance. And that seemed to be the position again in Mr. Kuznetsov's remarks this morning. In this context I cannot help recalling a speech made on general and complete disarmament fairly recently -- on 18 July -- and I should like to quote from that speech as follows:

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"We are making genuine concessions and putting forward genuine, quite specific proposals, but the United States is dissatisfied. Why? Because all its proposals have not been accepted. No, if you wish to negotiate on an equal basis, please table your proposals and say what you are prepared to concede and on what questions you are prepared to compromise." (ENDC/PV.59, p. 37)

And again, from the same speech:

"... not only do you not take any step forward, but you are even dissatisfied because we are moving closer to you. What sort of negotiations are these?" (ibid., p. 39)

Those are questions which we might pertinently ask in the present connexion; but whose words are they? They are the words of Mr. Zorin. That was what he said to us then. Are we not entitled to quote the same sentiments back to him and to our new Soviet colleague?

In this vital matter, in fact, the Soviet Government has moved backwards. The United States and United Kingdom have moved forwards progressively, both on inspection and on detection. The door is wide open now for a negotiated agreement. It is no good Mr. Kuznetsov talking to us about ultimatum. This is not a question of ultimatum at all; this is a question of genuine moving forward on the basis of the best scientific information we have. It is he who has given the ultimatum in refusing that very small amount of on-site inspection that is necessary.

So we are moving forward. We want to get a negotiated agreement and if the Soviet Government will match moves on our side by one move on its side, then we might all achieve it. If we are sincere when we make speeches about wanting to stop nuclear tests, about the dangers to mankind of the nuclear race, about the risks of more and more countries becoming nuclear Powers, then we must be prepared, each of us, to accept something that we may not wholly like in order to reach an agreement. We have moved, and that is a touchstone of sincerity. If the Soviet Government is sincere it will move too. And the very last words of the prepared part of the speech which Mr. Kuznetsov made to us were:

"As far as the Soviet Union is concerned it will, as before, spare no efforts to achieve the solution of this urgent problem: the conclusion of an agreement to put an end to explosions ..." (supra. p.29)

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

All right. I ask him: what effort has the USSR made recently? What forward steps has it taken to meet us? Let him enumerate just one, and we will look at it most gladly. It is the West which has made the moves forward; so words of this sort mean nothing. If we are going to make progress we have to have more than words. We have to have undertakings to come forward to meet us.

What then is preventing our conclusion of a treaty which would bring about the cessation of nuclear tests and thus allay the fears of mankind throughout the world? It is simply that the Soviet Union alone of the nuclear Powers claims a privileged position so far as inspection is concerned; it alone considers that its own internal secrecy, a secrecy such as no other State attempts or wishes to maintain, is more important than the deliverance of mankind from the threat of extinction. That and that alone frustrates the successful conclusion of this pressing and most urgent task.

Mr. de ARAUJO CASTRO (Brazil): On behalf of the Brazilian delegation I wish to make a few preliminary observations at the present stage of our debate on the question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. We intend to intervene again at a later stage in the debate.

Today I would say that I have listened with the greatest interest and attention to the statements that have been made by the representatives of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom. My delegation is not yet in a position to make a reliable appraisal and evaluation of the reasons and arguments advanced by the three nuclear Powers. We feel, however, that the elements, data and positions submitted today, together with the valuable contribution offered some days ago (ENDC/PV.64, pp.5 et seq.) by Mrs. Myrdal, the representative of Sweden, deserve the fullest examination by this Committee, which cannot disregard and should rather fully explore any possible developments in the situation.

My delegation has carefully considered the contents of the verbatim record (ENDC/SC.I/PV.23) of the meeting of our Sub-Committee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests held on 9 August. We cannot, of course, regard that document as a report of progress; we insist none the less on the view that it should be taken as a progress report, since we, for our part, will not accept any report from the Sub-Committee as final until and unless it is able to express agreement on the subject

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which we still consider as the most urgent on our agenda, and one to which we are still prepared to give first priority. We shall insist on this matter which, at this stage, comes before all other issues under consideration. The present stalemate -- for there is one -- should have the effect not of leading us to ignore or minimize the issue but, on the contrary, of rendering it all the more pressing, cogent and urgent.

In its statement of 6 August (ENDC/PV.66) the Brazilian delegation expressed the view that world public opinion cannot take seriously our efforts in regard to the drafting of a treaty on general and complete disarmament if we cannot agree on the clear-cut direct and urgent issue of a nuclear cease-fire. Nothing said at the meeting of the Sub-Committee or at today's meeting deflects us from the view that the eight-nation joint memorandum (ENDC/28) of 16 April is wide enough and flexible enough to serve as a rallying point for divergent views -- and we still have plenty of them. In that document we find the recognition of the principle of control, a principle which I deem essential to and inherent in any measure of disarmament. We still think that through mutual concessions and constructive realism an agreement is clearly possible on the mode of control envisaged in the aforementioned document.

As I have said, we have carefully considered the reasons and arguments advanced by the two sides for adhering to their respective positions and for agreeing to disagree. We respect them and we try to understand their motives for not making further concessions at this stage. We may make some comments on those positions later, but today it would be futile to pin down or single out responsibilities.

If the great Powers, unable to find a mutually acceptable solution for the problem of the cessation of nuclear tests on the basis or along the lines of the eight-nation joint memorandum, choose the way of bitter polemics and reciprocal recrimination, then the joint memorandum will descend from the limbo referred to by Mr. de Mello Franco into the depths of acrimony and propaganda. Somehow or other negotiations have never materialized, and in diplomacy there is no substitute for negotiation. What is really needed on both sides is mutual confidence, a spirit of compromise, a desire to make concessions and a willingness to face realities. What is needed is negotiation; and it will take all the things I have mentioned to

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transform this document, as indeed we must transform it, into an eighteen-nation joint memorandum -- because even seventeen may not be enough. We were gratified to see that, notwithstanding their present differences and divergencies, all three nuclear Powers have today reaffirmed their desire to negotiate. May I wish them god speed in their efforts, for this is a subject on which we cannot afford to lose hope. We have little more than hope left, and we are not going to part with it.

As a last word, I wish to congratulate our Soviet colleague and his countrymen for the remarkable scientific achievement of a few days ago, an achievement which is a new milestone in man's endeavour in the direction of the conquest of space and, as we hope, its peaceful utilization for the benefit of all mankind.

The Brazilian delegation also wishes to welcome Mr. Kuznetsov to our Committee and to express its best wishes to our co-Chairman, Mr. Zorin.

Mr. LACHS (Poland): Shall I proceed with my speech now or would the Chairman prefer me to make it tomorrow in view of the late hour?

The CHAIRMAN (Bulgaria) (translation from French): I still have on the list of speakers the delegations of Poland, Italy, the United Arab Republic, Czechoslovakia, Canada and Bulgaria, and I think that others will also wish to speak. Perhaps we could fix the date of our next meeting and adjourn this meeting now.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): I am very glad the representative of Poland has raised this point. I thought that if it were acceptable to my Soviet colleague we might recommend to the Committee that instead of devoting tomorrow to the subject of general and complete disarmament we might adjourn now and devote tomorrow to a further meeting on the subject of nuclear testing in view of the number of speakers and the paramount interest of members of the Committee in this matter.

Mr. KUZNETSOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): We share the opinion which Mr. Dean has just expressed and we think that the considerations he has put forward deserve our attention. We support what he has said.

The CHAIRMAN (Bulgaria) (translation from French): The co-Chairmen agree on resumption of the discussion on nuclear tests tomorrow. Is there any objection?

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): I entirely agree that the discussion on nuclear tests should continue tomorrow. But I would go further, and propose that this discussion on nuclear tests should continue without pause till it is concluded. I think it is particularly useful for all delegations to have an idea of the discussion as a whole. I hope, therefore, that we shall not substitute the discussion on general and complete disarmament for that on nuclear tests.

The CHAIRMAN (Bulgaria) (translation from French): If I understood him aright, the Italian representative wants the discussion to be continued till all the speakers on the list have spoken on nuclear tests. Have the co-Chairmen any objection?

Mr. KUZNETSOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): It seems to me that the representative of Italy is rightly anxious that the question of discontinuing nuclear weapon tests should be discussed here as fully as possible. I think there is hardly any need to decide immediately the question of how we are to conduct the meeting on the day after tomorrow. Perhaps we could agree now on the work for tomorrow. As for any subsequent plan, we can obviously revert to that subject tomorrow.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): I think the suggestion made by the representative of the Soviet Union is worthy of our consideration. I suggest that we should, as already agreed, devote tomorrow's meeting to nuclear tests and that if, at the end of that meeting, someone wishes to speak further we can take that into consideration then.

The CHAIRMAN (Bulgaria) (translation from French): The co-Chairmen agree that we should discuss nuclear tests tomorrow, and settle tomorrow the agenda for subsequent meetings.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I wish to avail myself of a few minutes in order to thank the representative of the United States for his remarks about me. I must say that, for my part, I can also express satisfaction at the co-operation which has taken place with the United States delegation and with Mr. Dean personally during our work as co-Chairmen. I wish to express the hope that this co-operation will not only be maintained but will be still further developed between our two delegations because it seems to me that this co-operation is a guarantee of considerable success in the work of the whole Committee.

I also wish to thank all my colleagues for the remarks they have made today about my work here, and I wish to thank all my colleagues for their co-operation during our work. Mr. Godber expressed the hope that I was going to become a cosmonaut. I can disillusion him: I have no intention of becoming a cosmonaut. In the Soviet Union there are many very fine young men who, as the experience of the last few days has shown, successfully carry out this honourable task of peaceful exploration of outer space.

Mr. Godber expressed the hope that I would become a cosmonaut and fly over Geneva. Although I shall not be flying over Geneva as a cosmonaut, I shall be keeping an eye on Geneva whether from Moscow or from New York.

With those remarks, I should like to end my brief intervention and to express once more my deep gratitude to all my colleagues for their co-operation during our work together at this Conference.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its sixty-ninth plenary meeting at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Tarabanov, First Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs and representative of Bulgaria.

"Statements were made by the representative of the United States of America, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and Brazil.

"The next plenary meeting of the Conference, which will be devoted to the continuation of the consideration of the question of a treaty on the banning of nuclear tests, will be held on Wednesday, 15 August 1962, at 10 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.

